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Abstract:
This study demonstrates the quantitative, as well as the qualitative, role of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
The Norwegian nominal tariff and non-tariff barriers are identified and thoroughly quantified.
Computations of effective rates of protection (ERP) show that NTBs entirely dominate tariffs as
direct contributors to primary factor income, which again is an important determinant in allocation of
resources among industries. The indirect input-output effects play a decisive role. This points to the
importance of estimating the nominal trade barrier inputs properly; when a biased estimate is
spread throughout the input-output system, not even the direction of the miscalculation will be easy
to predict. In order to demonstrate the qualitative role, NTBs are categorised into price-oriented and
quantity-oriented, respectively. ERP computations illustrate that the conclusions of policy analyses
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51. Introduction
During the last twenty years, international and regional negotiations on trade liberalisation have
progressed rapidly in the field of tariff reductions. However, the inventiveness of governments in
establishing ever less transparent protective systems has developed accordingly. The size of the
problem is not easy to map. To quantify and aggregate Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) involves careful
considerations with respect to the purpose of the study as well as to the specific industrial
organisation of the market in focus. Consequently, to match official statistical databases with NTB
analyses is difficult. This problem was clearly elucidated during the Uruguay round of GATT, where
NTB reductions were of major concern. The negotiations were complicated by deficiency of
comparable information on the state of the art on the implications of commitments. Comprehensive
databases are established, like the UNCTAD Multi-Country Database on Trade Control Measures,
which lists several forms of NTBs and reports their frequencies within commodity groups. These are
essential data, but unfortunately not designed for mapping the quantitative effects of trade policy and
policy reforms1.
Lack of statistical sources has led many trade economists to restrict their analyses to effects of tariffs,
only2. Alternatively, NTBs are represented by count measures similar or allied to the UNCTAD
ratios3 or by estimating their effects in rough terms4. An early work of Roningen and Yeats (1976)
represents an impressive multi-country, multi-commodity study, where NTBs are quantified by their
estimated price effects. Even in several studies of more recent date, their estimates directly or
indirectly constitute the empirical basis for NTB quantification. The problem is that the figures, dated
1973, are considerably out of date.
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 See Roningen and Yeats (1976), who also illustrate this point empirically.
2
 See e.g. Brown et al. (1995) on protection to manufacturing industries and Roland-Holst et al. (1995).
3
 See e.g. Brown et al. (1995) on service NTBs, Greenaway and Hine (1993), and Leamer (1990).
4
 See e.g. Antille et al. (1993) and Haaland and Tollefsen (1994).
6This study quantifies and categorises trade barriers in terms of price effects. Two main groups are
identified: Price-oriented measures are tariffs and other penetration costs, which represent fixed,
extra costs of providing foreign products. Quantity-oriented NTBs restrict import to certain amounts.
Note that high penetration costs, that in practice prohibit import, also fall into this category. Maybe
more severe than to miss in quantitative terms, is the inclination to neglect the qualitative difference
between these two categories. While the price effect of penetration costs will not be affected by
market changes, the equivalent price effect of quantity-oriented NTBs will. It is common to
completely neglect this distinction, by either modelling all NTBs as penetration costs, or by treating
them all as quantity-oriented with endogenous price effects. For a commodity subject to both classes
of NTBs, the import, production, and output price will be explained by the stronger, while the other
will have no independent effect. Thus, stating the binding measure and its qualitative nature is
essential for proper NTB treatment. Many studies do for example fail to classify redundantly high
tariffs as quantity-oriented NTBs.
With great respect for the overwhelming task of treating the various protection measures properly in
large, general multi-country, multi-sectoral models, my contribution is, by a much simpler model, to
make some points on the implications of applying quantitatively and qualitatively simplifying
assumptions on protection. I apply an input-output price model for the Norwegian economy, that
computes Effective Rates of Protection (ERPs) for the years 1989, 1991 and 1994. An ERP analysis
estimates the direct effects from trade policy reforms on the ability of industries to reward their
primary factors in unit terms, see e.g. Corden (1985). The precedence of ERP computations to
nominal protection measures is that they capture not only weighted producer price changes, but also
simultaneous effects of protection on input prices. Under certain conditions, ERPs may serve as
indicators of the allocative effects of protection.
7One result of the computations is that ERPs and nominal protection measures deviate significantly.
This indicates that nominal measures provide poor information on the allocative effects of protection.
The fact that input-output multipliers seem so important, also strengthen the need for proper
estimation of the nominal inputs; miscalculations will be spread throughout the input-output system in
a complex manner. A second finding is that the importance of tariffs is inferior in the Norwegian trade
policy system. Thus, omitting NTBs in trade policy studies is quite misleading. Thirdly, the analysis
states that the interdependency between quantity-oriented NTBs and other trade policy measures has
significant implications in terms of ERP. This interplay is just as relevant in more sophisticated,
general equilibrium models and need to be handled properly.
2. The ERP model
Nominal tariff rates are imposed on commodities. To shed light on allocative effects of the tariff
system, input-output relationships between commodities have to be accounted for. This was the idea
behind the concept Effective Rate of Protection, ERP, first introduced by Barber (1955) and
extensively applied and developed in the following two decades. In partial industry studies, the ERP
measure in a consistent way accounts for simultaneous effects of the complete tariff structure on that
industry. Under certain restricting assumptions, ERP analyses which cover all industries, may shed
light on the qualitative structural implications of the tariff system5.
                                                     
5
 ERPs may serve as allocative indicators, as long as the economy is described by a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS)
model. A known result in HOS analyses is that increasing the relative value added price of an industry, induces expansion of
value added in that industry at the expense of other industries (see e.g. Woodland (1982)). The ranking of industry-specific
ERPs indicates the qualitative structural implications of the tariff system. See Corden (1985), who also summarises the main
limitations of ERP computations.
8The ERP for industry j, is defined by
(1) ERP y y
yj
j j
j
=
−
1 0
0
i.e. the relative change in yj , the effective output price (or value added per unit production)6 in
industry j, from moving from state 1, with tariffs present, to state 0, with tariffs absent (see Corden
(1985)). Consider an industry with tradable outputs and inputs in fixed proportions. The effective
output price in each state is determined by:
(2) y b P b Pj ijO i ijI i
ii
= − ∑∑
where Pi is the domestic price of commodity i and bijI  and bijO are fixed input- and output coefficients
of commodity i in industry j. By assuming perfectly competitive markets, arbitrage implies that Pi
equals the lowest possible price of its foreign substitute included freight and insurance costs, Pi
w (in
the following referred to as the reference price), corrected by possible nominal tariffs, ti (in ad
valorem terms) :
(3) P P ti iw i= +( )1
In state 0, ti is equal to zero. Equation (1), (2) and (3) define ERP for industry j in terms of given tariff
rates, reference prices and input-/output-coefficients.
While the ERP concept of the early literature merely included ordinary tariffs, this analysis is
extended to embrace NTBs, as well. Besides being quantitatively prominent, the qualitative effects of
NTBs on output prices and unit value added can be quite different from those of tariffs. To illuminate
this, I distinguish between two classes of NTBs: Price-oriented and quantity-oriented.
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 Actually, the relevant relative change is in value added per unit of primary factor input. However, constant input
coefficients are assumed, and the two concepts are thus identical.
9Price-oriented measures represent a fixed penetration cost mark-up on the reference price. Tariffs are
familiar examples. Other non-tariff examples are technical specifications, which rise production costs
in the exporting country, or home preferences in government procurement, formulated as a fixed
acceptable price gap between domestic and foreign bids. When we label the protection rate in ad
valorem terms of such non-tariff penetration costs (or the penetration cost rate) t jP , we have domestic
prices determined by:
(4) ( )( )P P t ti iw i iP= + +1 1 , i ∈T
T includes all tradables freely traded or protected by tariffs or other price-oriented measures. It also
includes exportables subject to export subsidies or other export promoting measures, that creates
analogous gaps between producer prices and world market prices. Actually, under the assumption of
perfect competition, existence of both import and export of the same good cannot represent an
equilibrium, unless the policy instruments towards export flows and import flows are applied
simultaneously and with the same strength.
Quantity-oriented barriers restrict the quantity of imports to a binding maximum amount or
completely prohibit imports. Quotas and import prohibitions are examples; so are measures that in
practice prohibit imports, such as redundantly high penetration costs. The rate of protection of such
barriers may be measured by their tariff equivalent in ad valorem terms, tiQ, which is defined as the
relative difference between the producer price and the import price inclusive of tariffs and non-tariff
penetration costs:
(5a) ( )( )t
P
P t ti
Q i
i
w
i i
P= + +
−
1 1
1 , i ∈Q
or analogously:
(5b) ( )( )P P t t ti iw i iP iQ= + + +1 1 1( ) , i ∈Q
where Q is the set of (potentially) tradable commodities protected by quantity-oriented barriers.
10
The essential difference between price-oriented and quantity-oriented barriers relates to their output
price formation. While exogenous variables determine output prices for all i∈ T in equation (4),
equivalent tariff rates for quantity-oriented barriers, defined in equation (5), are endogenous. As long
as a commodity is protected by the latter, e.g. a given import quota, its price will be determined by
domestic marginal costs and consumers marginal willingness to pay. Thus, for given ti and tiP, the
equivalent tariff rate varies in response to shifts in demand and supply curves. Figure 1a illustrates a
shift in the supply curve from Si0 to Si1 under a binding import quota, Ii
_
. The output price falls from
Pi0 to Pi1 as tiQ adjusts to the shift. Quite similarly, tiQ would adjust to partial changes in ti and tiP, and
the result would be unaltered output price. An elimination of the tariff from a rate of ti0, is shown in
Figure 1b. The effect of the quota rises from tiQ0 to tiQ1, and the price level is maintained. However, if
penetration costs are shifted sufficiently upwards, they may come to dominate and turn an import
quota impotent, as illustrated by the shift in tariffs to ti2 in Figure 1b. Then, exogenous penetration
costs come to determine the output price.
Imperfect competition can be regarded as a third kind of barrier. Several aspects of non-competitive
market structures is incompatible with the ERP model7. However, market power that results from
political shelter may be consistently included. By interpreting insufficient regulation of the monopoly
power as protection policies, mark-ups may be relevantly included in the protection rates. Opening the
markets will assumingly stimulate competition and erode mark-ups8.
                                                     
7
 See Fæhn and Grünfeld (1997).
8
 Natural monopolies may be regarded as natural barriers to trade, rather than protection.
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Figure 1. Responses in the equivalent tariff rate to various shifts
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To see the implications of prohibitive NTBs on value added formation and thus ERPs, the model used
must be presented in more detail9. The three years in focus, 1989, 1991, and 1994, are represented by
respective input-output matrixes for the Norwegian economy based on the National Accounts (NA)10.
The production structure is of a Leontief type with fixed output- and input coefficients and constant
returns to scale. Competition is perfect between producers of homogenous products. Most industries
produce multiple outputs, including one (or few) main product(s). If the main product of an industry
belongs to the set of tradable goods, T, the industry is classified as exposed to foreign competition.
Main products in the set Q are produced in so-called politically sheltered industries. A third class of
industries are naturally sheltered, implying that their main products are non-tradables grouped in the
set N. By accounting for all sets of commodities, relation (2), using (4) and (5), becomes:
(6) ( )( ) ( )( )( )y b P t t b P t t t b Pj ijO iw i iP
i
ij
O
i
w
i i
P
i
Q
i
ij
O
i
i
= + + + + + + +
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∑ ∑ ∑1 1 1 1 1
T Q N
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For the main producer of a commodity t∈ T, all trade policy changes will fully affect unit value
added, yj and thereby ERPj. For the main producer of a commodity q∈ Q changes in protection rates
will be counteracted by changes in tqQ, leaving yj unaltered. This corresponds to the reaction of Pn for
the main producer of a commodity n∈ N, which will also exactly neutralise the effects on yj. For
politically or naturally sheltered industries ERPs will in other words equal zero, by definition. This
may be regarded as a shortcoming of the ERP concept, which was originally designed for small, open
economies with no sheltered industries. The ERPs calculated in our extended model is to be
understood as input-output corrected ERPs, where effective protection of politically or naturally
sheltered industries is accounted for through higher input prices in the exposed industries.
                                                     
9
 See Holmøy et al. (1993) and Fæhn et al. (1995) for more comprehensive presentations of the model (in Norwegian).
10
 It is worth noting that comparability between 1994 and the two earlier years is somewhat reduced by revisions in the 1994
NA base. Also, the 1994 model aggregation is somewhat finer than in earlier versions.
13
3. Methods for estimating effects of protection
3.1 . Alternative approaches
The price effects of protection will be reflected in the (sometimes hypothetical) import prices, which
due to arbitrage will equal the price obtained by domestic producers. The most common and general
approach to estimating protection, is to measure the price gap between free trade prices and prices
affected by protection, and assign the difference to protection. The method measures the entire
protection rate of a product, but cannot identify the policy measures which create this gap.
Interpreting the relative price gap as a protection rate should be done with care, as other features of
the data or the markets in question may have affected the prices. Below, I will mention some general
methodological problems that have been of special importance to this study.
3.1.1 . Choice of commodity specification
First, the commodities under observation must be representative for the focused commodity aggregate
with respect to trade policies. Second, the domestic and the reference product must be homogenous
from the view of consumers. In practice, this is a great problem even at the finest statistical level. If
the price of an import aggregate is used as reference, while only some of the items included are
subject to protection, the composition of imports tends to be biased towards unprotected commodities,
while the corresponding production aggregate will be biased towards the protected. The prices thus
cannot be compared. A special heterogeneity problem arises if consumers have preferences related to
the origin of the products, per se. The fact that exports often require a higher degree of processing
(like packing etc.) than do deliveries to domestic markets, is another inherent problem of
heterogeneity.
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3.1.2 . Choice of domestic price
As the purpose of this study is to identify the contribution of protection to unit value added, the
producer price will be the most relevant11. In case of imperfect competition, mark-ups will be
included. I have argued that these may be relevant to include. Producer prices are not observable in
the markets, thus difficult to identify. It may be necessary to deduce the producer price from observed
prices after some distribution or processing. We then need information about excise taxes, value
added and margins in the distribution and processing activities.
3.1.3 . Choice of reference price
For importables, it is common to use the import c.i.f. price as reference. In many cases this price will
overestimate the true reference price:
• If trade policies discriminate with respect to place of origin, imports will tend to come from
countries with the lowest import price inclusive of the effect of import barriers, while the reference
price is defined as the lowest import price exclusive of trade barriers. Normally, the import price
will thus overestimate the true reference price. If imports from the cheapest country is totally
excluded from the market, it may be difficult to identify from where free trade imports would
originate. Due to problems of heterogeneity, it is not obvious that imports from countries with the
highest trade barriers are to represent the reference. I will return to this problem in the discussion
of aggregation issues below.
• Exporters may capture parts of the difference between the producer and the reference price,
rendering the import c.i.f. price higher than the reference price. The occasion may be market power
of exporters (often present in case of voluntary export restraints) or import barriers that represent
real costs to the exporter (as technical barriers).
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 For an input, the purchase price net of domestic taxes, which coincides with the producer price in the supplying industry,
will be the appropriate price.
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If the world markets are characterised by dumping (as e.g. markets for agricultural products), one may
also argue that import c.i.f. prices underestimate the real reference price. When studying the
Norwegian trade regime in isolation and in a descriptive manner, imports to cover the relatively small
Norwegian market would probably be available at dumping prices. Therefore, they are regarded as
relevant reference prices in this study.
If the import c.i.f. price is not representative or not available at all, some of the following alternative
reference proxies may be applied:
• Lowest observed producer price in other countries (when adjusted by transport costs).
• The export f.o.b. price added with transport costs from a relevant supply country.
• The import c.i.f./export f.o.b. price of a neighbouring country.
Also, various specific methods are developed, in order to measure the isolated effect of particular
protection measures. Laird and Yeats (1990) present a broad class of methods applied in studies of
specific protection instruments. The advantage is that one may identify the isolated effect of the
measure. Interdependency problems may, however, forbid to add up the estimates for each single
import barrier, as only the binding determines the level of protection. Further, if price-oriented import
barriers exceed the upper limit defined by domestic market conditions, the redundant part will only
have potential protective force in case of changed market conditions.
3.2 . The approaches of this study
For the two policy measures tariffs and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), specific measurement
methods are applied (see Section 4). This enables us to identify their partial effect. In case of VERs,
the price gap method using import c.i.f. prices would most likely underestimate the equivalent tariff
rate. First, VERs are applied to low-cost imports, only. The main share of import thus originates from
16
high-cost countries, which raises the average import price. Further, even providing country-specific
import prices holds a problem, as quota rents are likely to be accrued by exporters.
For all other commodities sheltered by NTBs, the price gap method is applied, primarily on the basis
of domestic producer prices and import c.i.f. (or occasionally, export f.o.b.) prices. In absence of
relevant import c.i.f. data, foreign export prices or producer prices adjusted by transportation costs,
form the reference prices. Unless strongly affected by protection, EU prices are chosen, to ensure a
satisfactory degree of homogeneity. Where only international retail prices are available, differences in
sales taxes, value added and margins are accounted for. To support NTBs as the plausible explanation
to the gaps, information on industry structure and trade policy is studied thoroughly. The rates of NTB
protection, tQ and tP, are derived by excluding the tariff rates from the total ad valorem price gap.
Collection of data is, when necessary, made on the finest Norwegian NA level (about 1500
commodity groups). If price data are available only for other years than those in focus, prices are
developed by producer price indexes and import c.i.f. price indexes. Aggregates consisting of
penetration cost protected as well as quantitatively protected commodities, have been split into two
sub-aggregates, due to the different determination of prices. For each industry whose main product is
subject to heterogeneous trade policy, two equations similar to (6) are introduced, one for each
branch. This is possible, as information on output and trade policy is specified at the finest NA level.
The input structures are, however, not mapped at this detailed level, and are as an approximation,
assumed identical for the two sub-branches12.
3.3 . Aggregation methods
Calculation of protection rates requires aggregation along two dimensions; countries of origin and
products. Aggregation problems with respect to place of origin are only topical if protection policies
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 A detailed description of this procedure (in Norwegian) is available in Fæhn et al. (1995), Appendix 2.
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towards exporters differ. This is the case for Norwegian tariff rates, which are zero for almost all
manufactures (except from processed food) imported from EFTA and EU, as well as from several
developing countries13, while remaining imports are subject to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rates
of GATT. In addition, VERs on several textiles and clothes were undertaken exclusively by several
low-cost producing countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. Current import patterns do partly reflect the
preference structures of consumers, but they are also affected by these preferential policies. Ideally,
weighting with the countries' import shares in the hypothetical case of no import barriers, would
reflect the relevant rates. If high-cost countries still kept a positive import share in the hypothetical
case of removed trade barriers, this would purely reflect preferences. The current import-weighted
rate on the one side and the unconcessional rate on the other, may be regarded as the two extremes of
a range covering the ideal rate. I have chosen the import-weighted average in this study, motivated by
the fact that quality differences play an essential role in explaining imports of highly processed
industrial products. Estimates for Textiles and clothes are particularly vulnerable to the choice of
weights, as discrimination is strongly prevalent. Thus, here the ideal weights are approached, by using
a hypothetical weighting scheme representing absence of quotas, but maintenance of tariffs (Melchior
(1993)). To indicate the theoretical range, the unconcessional MFN tariff rates and VER equivalent
tariff rates are also reported (in Table 2).
Aggregation of protection rates along single products has been comprehensively discussed in the
literature. The bias of import weights is pointed out by for instance Johnson (1969). Basevi (1971)
suggests that weights should generally be chosen according to the focus of the study. In the present,
the question is how protection alter unit factor income in a sector, both through raising producer
prices and through raising costs of intermediates. Production and input shares, respectively, are thus
appropriate.
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 They are given concessional conditions through the General System of Preferences. Important exceptions applies to several
food articles, textiles and clothes.
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The chosen weights are:
(7) αi m m
W
m m
W
m
X P
X P
= M
=
∑
1
, i T Q∈ ∪
where Xm is quantity of one of the M single products in the production or input aggregate, i, in the
relevant year. The production and input values are evaluated in reference prices, so that the price
component is not affected by trade barriers, to obtain the same reference point as in the definition of
protection rates (see equation (5a)).
4. Quantification
4.1 . Tariff barriers
Ad valorem tariff rates are computed by dividing tariff revenues by values of imports on the finest NA
level. This method excludes tariff rates that are prohibitive, which are by definition quantity-oriented
and captured in the equivalent tariff rates.
In Table 1, average nominal tariff rates on outputs are reported for the years 1989, 1991 and 1994.
The most striking data feature is that tariffs are of little significance in the Norwegian trade policy
system. Only Textiles and clothes, Processed food and Beverages and tobacco had rates exceeding 1
percent. For Textiles and clothes, one might suspect the weighting scheme to produce underestimates,
due to highly prevalent discriminatory tariff policy14. The upper limit, represented by the MFN rates
in Table 2, is about 4-5 times higher. Evidence indicates increased substitutability between low-cost
and Western products over the years, pulling the true rate closer to the MFN rates (Melchior (1994)).
There is a decreasing tendency in the tariff rates from 1991 to 1994. With the Treaty on the European
Economic Area (EEA) of 1994, Norway joined the European Common Market. The treaty only
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 The weights are adjusted for estimated effects of VERs.
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reduced tariff rates on some agricultural and processed food products. Most of the decreasing
tendency is due to weight shifts, inter alia explained by liberalised rules of origin in the EEA. Only
for Textiles and clothes, the average rate increased, as weights shifted towards high tariffs. Stronger
substitutability and increased supply capacity in developing countries, especially China, support this
development.
Table 1. Weighted average tariff rates (%)
1989 1991 1994
Agricultural products 0.2 0.4 0.2
Forestry products 0.1 0.0 0.0
Fish 0.0 0.0 0.0
Processed food 2.9 3.0 1.9
Beverages and tobacco 1.6 2.8 2.0
Textiles and clothes 2.7 2.7 3.1
Wood and wood products 0.1 0.1 0.0
Chemical and mineral products 0.3 0.4 0.1
Printing and publishing products 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pulp and paper articles 0.0 0.0 0.0
Industrial chemicals 0.4 0.4 0.2
Petrol 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fuel oils 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metals 0.1 0.1 0.1
Machinery and hardware 0.7 0.7 0.3
Repair 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ships 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil platforms 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ocean transport and petroleum explor. 0.0 0.0 0.0
Raw oil 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural gas 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pipe transport 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.2 . Non-Tariff Barriers
For each output aggregate where non-tariff trade policy arrangements exist, the data and the resulting
estimates are presented in detail below. Table 3 sums up the nominal non-tariff protection estimates
for the outputs and their qualitative character (tQ or tP). For aggregates including goods with quantity-
20
oriented import restrictions, also the coverage of the average tQ is reported, i.e. the percentage of the
price15 influenced by quantity measures.
4.2.1 . Agricultural products
The aggregate encompasses non-processed farm products. In all the years included, quantitative
import restrictions and strict quality standards accommodated administered producer prices, stipulated
in yearly negotiations between the government and the farmer organisations. Coverage is practically
100%. Farm products were little affected by the EEA treaty of 1994. The homogeneity of products, as
well as the degree of industry regulation, makes data easily available. The basis for the estimates for
grain, meat and eggs are the data constituting the price support component of the OECD Producer
Subsidy Equivalents (PSE)16. For milk, the PSE figures would be irrelevant as agricultural protection.
As reference, OECD uses the New Zealand farm gate price inclusive of transport costs for processed
milk powder, which in my context would represent a confusion of the trade policy towards
Agriculture and Processing of food. Raw milk produced in Agriculture is subject to considerable
natural barriers to trade. In the free trade case, imports from Denmark would be a feasible substitute
to domestic raw milk, and the Danish farm gate prices17 included tanker transport costs constitute the
chosen reference price. Horticultural products are not represented in the PSE material. Here, producer
prices are compared to import c.i.f. prices, or occasionally, adjusted foreign retail prices18. The
calculations yield a somewhat declining tQ over the years.
                                                     
15
 Prices are here weighted by shares of production value at reference prices.
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 See OECD (1990 and 1995).
17
 See EUROSTAT (1994).
18
 Producer prices are reported in Budget Committee for Agriculture (1990, 1992 and 1995)). Import c.i.f. prices are drawn
from Statistics Norway (monthly) and Nersten et al. (1992), while foreign retail prices are found in Borg and Nersten (1993)
and Statistics Norway (1989a).
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4.2.2 . Processed food
Motivated by quite different trade policy regimes, the food products are split into three model
aggregates: Fish products, Meat and dairy products, and Other food products19. No trade policy is
directed towards Fish products, while the remaining are protected by several arrangements,
rationalised by the aim of sheltering agriculture. The very organisation of the Meat and dairy
production, in farmer co-operatives, reflects this. Yearly agreements between the farmers and the
industry are designed to ensure transfer of profits to the agricultural sector. This is made possible by a
highly protective import quota system and strict phytosanitary standards. Except for a widening of the
import quotas for cheese, the EEA treaty had minor effect on the import regime of Meat and dairy
products. Other food products include, inter alia, grain, which is produced and traded by an
intentionally non-profit state monopoly. It has purchase duty on domestic grain to regulated prices;
fodder prices are also regulated, while flour prices are set by the monopoly. In effect, these
arrangements were not touched by the establishment of the EEA. The rest of Other food products are
mainly highly processed food from private enterprises. Tariffs or variable import levies, warranted by
the so-called Price compensation arrangements (PCA) with EU and other EFTA countries, restrict
imports. The intention of PCA is to compensate the industry for the extra costs related to their
exclusion from the world market for agricultural inputs. A symmetric refunding arrangement applies
to exportables. The EEA agreement intended to reform PCA, but the negotiations reached a deadlock
and the old system still remained in 1994. We let the protection rate for Other food products
endogenously respond to cost variations stemming from input price changes on Agricultural products
and Meat and dairy products, in accordance with the intention of PCA. All other cost or income
changes are assumed to leave the protection rate unaltered, as for an exogenous tP. Thus, the coverage
of prohibitive barriers in Processed food is thus endogenous, with a potential of 75%, if all protection
of Other food products is included. The NTB protection rates for Processed food in Table 3 veil a
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variance from zero rates for Fish products to 60-70% for Meat and dairy products, while protection
of Other food products amounts to around average20.
4.2.3 . Beverages and tobacco
These products were first of all sheltered by technical import barriers, as well as an advertising
prohibition, favouring already existing market participants. The NTBs are interpreted as penetration
costs. Import, production and sale of wine and spirits was state monopolised. This arrangement is in
conflict with the EEA rules, but were not altered until January 1996. However, several harmonised
production and packing standards came into force from 1994. Comparing retail prices exclusive of
taxes is here precarious, due to presumably large variations in mark-ups and unit value added. Rather,
data for beverages are drawn from the Norwegian trade and industry statistics21. Problems of
heterogeneity are present in the material. Export prices were chosen if the composition of exports
presumably corresponded better to the composition of production. In case of tobacco trade and
industry data were scarce, and we have rather undertaken retail price comparisons22. The estimated
penetration cost rate gradually declined through the period.
4.2.4 . Textiles and clothes
Imports of several low cost items were restricted by VER quotas23. The quotas have gradually been
widened or eliminated from 1990 to 1994. Their equivalent tariff rates are assumed endogenous in the
simulations, which implies that they never touch the upper limit defined by the price of freely
imported substitutes. Coverage of tQ fell from 28% and 26% in the first two years, to 22% in 1994.
Estimates are based on studies by Melchior (1993 and 1994). He uses an Armington model with three
differentiated products: domestic, imports from low-cost countries and free imports. The idea is that
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 Price data originate from several domestic and international sources (Statistics Norway (1989a, 1989b, 1990 and monthly),
Nersten et al. (1992), Borg and Nersten (1993), ILO(1992) and EUROSTAT (1994)).
21
 See Statistics Norway (1989a, 1990 and monthly).
22
 See Statistics Norway (1989a).
23
 Norway participated in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement of GATT.
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in case of quotas, preferences for heterogeneity allow prices on low cost imports to increase relative
to the other imperfect substitutes. The quota rent is calculated from observations of the low cost and
free imports’ market shares for the concerned items in periods with export quotas, as well as the
respective hypothetical shares in case of no quotas. The latter are induced from observations on
market shares in periods without quota restrictions, adjusted for other observed changes in supply and
demand. The estimates are supported by observed price changes in a period where the Norwegian
system changed from import- to export quotas, as well as by quota prices in Hong Kong. Our model
with homogenous products cannot explain the factual variation in prices among products of different
origin, while Melchior's approach accounts for this. His equivalent tariff rates on the remaining
regulated items amount to 22% in 1990 and 38% in 1994. The rise is largely explained by increased
export capacity in Asian countries. As coverage has decreased, the weighted estimates in Table 3 blur
this development. Average tQs are low. The upper estimates, giving the low-cost countries all weight,
are 3-6 times higher, as reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Protection rates against imports of Textiles and clothes from low-cost countries
Year MFN tariff rates (%) Quota rents (%) Total protection rate (%)
1989 13.0 6.4 20.8
1991 13.2 3.3 17.1
1994 14.1 6.3 21.4
4.2.5 . Chemical and mineral products
The equivalent tariff rates and coverage for this aggregate, reported in Table 3, arise from protected
pharmaceutical products and cement products. Pharmaceutical products were protected by technical
barriers, as well as import regulation, intended to limit the number of substitutable products. The
arrangement functioned as a quantitative restriction. The system was gradually liberalised from 1991,
and in 1994 the import regulation was removed. Left was still a detailed procedure of control and
approval, which had the character of technical price-oriented barriers. Estimated rates are based on a
study by Norman (1991), who estimated an equivalent tariff of 42% for 1985. Monopolistic
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competition and differentiated products were assumed and the result relies heavily on the price and
scale elasticities assumed. Some observations, which indicate a price fall of up to 40% from 1990 to
1994 for items subject to substantial liberalisation after 1991, support Norman's estimate. We have
index regulated Norman's estimate, attaining estimates of 25%, 20% and 16%, respectively for the
years 1989, 1991 and 1994. For cement products there existed no formal barriers to trade. However,
there are clear indications of trade having been prohibited by collusive behaviour and geographical
market sharing between the major European producers. We interpret such imperfectly competitive
behaviour as a consequence of implicit trade policy through insufficient competition policies
regulating the domestic cement monopoly. Market sharing works much like quantitative trade
restrictions. Quantification of the price gap is based on Sørgard (1992). In spite of scarce import, he
registered a significant increase from Sweden24 in the Norwegian boom period from 1986 to 1988.
Prices were 50% lower than Norwegian producer prices. As competition policy is probably not
capable of persistently and completely eliminating the strategic barriers raised by the industry, a
somewhat lower estimate of 80% is implemented for 1989 and 1991. From 1994 on, the competition
rules of EU apply to the entire EEA. Article 53 in the EEA treaty explicitly prohibits collusive market
behaviour. In 1994/95 the major cement producers of Europe, including the Norwegian, were
substantially fined for infringement of this article. As control and sanction systems approved quite
efficient, the remaining price gaps are not interpreted to result from political action (or rather lack of
action), and the NTBs are regarded as eliminated from 1994.
4.2.6 . Industrial chemicals
Within this commodity group, fertilisers were the only products found to be protected. In presence of
import restricting technical standards, domestic markets were strongly dominated by two suppliers.
Gabrielsen (1989) explains the Norwegian market as a duopoly with tacit market sharing, working to
quantitatively control imports. Governmental price regulations existed, but according to Gabrielsen,
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 Imports from more remote countries are partly prohibited by transport costs.
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duopoly power was still exploited in the domestic market. He estimates an equivalent tariff rate of
16% in 1988, based on the difference between domestic and German market prices adjusted for
quality differences and transport costs. We have index-regulated this estimate to 1989 and 1991. From
1994, the EEA treaty imposes harmonisation of technical specifications on fertilisers, as well as
abolishment of international price collusion. In absence of technical barriers, prices tended to fall in
1994, indicating procompetitive effects from the liberalisation. In light of the apparent efficiency of
the surveillance authorities, remaining price gaps are not attributed to persistent lack of competition
policy, and the equivalent tariff rates are set to zero.
Table 3. Effect, type and coverage of NTBs
Product Aggregate 1989 1991 1994
Effect type
(coverage)
Effect type
(coverage)
Effect type
(coverage)
Agricultural products 69 Q (100%) 71 Q (100%) 60 Q (100%)
Forestry products - - - - - -
Fish - - - - - -
Processed food 44 Q (100%) 49 Q (100%) 41 Q (75%)*)
Beverages and tobacco 35 P 30 P 25 P
Textiles and clothes 2 Q (26%) 1 Q (28%) 1 Q (22%)
Wood and wood products - - - - - -
Chemical and mineral products 8 Q (15%) 7 Q (13%) 1 P
Printing and publishing products - - - - - -
Pulp and paper articles - - - - - -
Industrial chemicals 3 Q (20%) 3 Q (20%) - -
Petrol - - - - - -
Fuel oils - - - - - -
Metals - - - - - -
Machinery and hardware 2 P 2 P - -
Repair - - - - - -
Ships - - - - - -
Oil platforms 3 P 3 P - -
«-» means not existing, «Q» means quantity-oriented, «P» means price-oriented.
*)
 Coverage is endogenous, with a maximum of 75%.
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4.2.7 . Hardware and machinery
Several electrical items and machines were subject to detailed technical specifications. In addition,
domestically produced equipment has been favoured in procurements by central and local service
providers of e.g. telecommunication, electrical power, railroad and highways. Before the
establishment of EEA, domestic authorities specified the standards and controlled products. Within
EEA, directives are now harmonised and approval in one country is sufficient for marketing within
the whole area. Further, the EEA treaty requires formal bid-challenge procedures for large
procurements and forbids discrimination. The estimates for 1989 and 1991 are price index regulated
figures from Norman and Orvedal (1990), and lay between 10% and 50% for the various items. The
calibration method presented by Smith and Venables (1988) is used in partial models with
differentiated products and economies of scale. Observed higher market shares in domestic markets
than in foreign markets are partly assigned to protection. In 1994, technical harmonisation and non-
discriminatory procurement procedures have effectively abolished political trade barriers.
4.2.8 . Oil platforms
Several reports indicate discriminatory procurement policies from the large oil producing enterprises,
who are aware of their reliance on concessions and goodwill from the Norwegian government. We
have based our quantification on a study by Asbjørn Habberstad A/S (1985), updated by the Ministry
of Oil and Energy (1989). Comparable average prices from domestic and foreign bidders are
presented. Norwegian prices were found to exceed comparable foreign prices by 11% on average
from 1986 to April 1989. As domestic contractors were nevertheless preferred in almost all the
projects, the accepted tender price differences may be interpreted as penetration cost rates. No
evidence suggests altered practice by 1991. After 1994, the possibilities for such discriminatory
practices have disappeared, leaving tP equal to zero.
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5. Effective Rates of Protection
5.1 . Effective vs. nominal protection rates
Figure 2 shows the time development of total ERP levels for all industries exposed to foreign
competition. The ERPs reported are percentage changes in the effective industry prices from
introducing the factual trade barriers into a reference state with free trade prices25. Figure 2 indicates a
strong allocative bias of the present trade policy in favour of Processing of food, beverages and
tobacco and Agriculture, both industries with ERPs above average26. This picture remains valid for all
periods, though ERP differences are less marked in 1994, much due to the EEA treaty.
Figure 2. ERPs for exposed industries in 1989, 1991 and 199427
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*) Due to low included reference levels, ERPs for Processing of food, beverages and tobacco 
exceed the upper bound of the scale in 1989 and 1991.
                                                     
25
 For industries with large absolute effects of protection on value added, the induced reference level (corrected for
protection) will be low. This contributes to high relative changes and ERPs.
26
 The average ERPs are weighted with factor income valued by reference prices.
27
 The industries are ranked according to their ERPs in 1989.
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Comparing the development of ERPs with the time movements in nominal protection rates in Table 1
and 3, shows that nominal measures are poor indicators on allocative effects. The figures reveal a
rather poor correlation, especially for the industries producing food, beverages, tobacco, textiles and
clothes. The precedence of ERP computations is that they capture not only producer price changes
(weighted with each product’s respective weight in the production), but also effects from changed
protection of inputs as well as changes in value added shares over time. An increase in the reference
value added share (i.e. corrected for protection) has the isolated effect of reducing ERP. The cases of
Agriculture and Processing of food, beverages and tobacco may serve as illustrative examples: In
spite of a fall in nominal protection rates for Agricultural products during the period, ERPs for
Agriculture escalated sharply. The explanation is primarily that influence from protection of inputs is
weaker than in previous years. In addition, a stronger output share of Agricultural products in 1994
more than outweighs the lower protection rate, resulting in a stronger effect on the industry price
index than in previous years (See Table 4). Also for Processed food, beverages and tobacco the
nominal rates fell (by a weighted average of 10%) during the period, but the fall in ERP was much
more dramatic, amounting to almost 70%. Behind lies an increased disadvantage of protected inputs.
This is combined with an increase in the reference value added share of 130% over the period, mainly
explained by a narrowing of the gap between the observed and the corrected value added share as
protection falls.
An important observation is thus that a non-negative direct product price support for all exposed
industries is encountered by indirect effects of protection through input costs. For several industries
these cost disadvantages dominate, rendering ERPs negative, as can be seen for industries like
Fisheries, Metal production and Manufacturing of wood products in Table 4. Behind the figures for
1989 and 1991, when protection was markedly negative, we find protection of important tradable
inputs. All the three industries consumed NTB-protected Machinery and hardware, and in the latter,
protected textiles in furniture production were also important. Interestingly, though, a look behind the
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table reveals that the strongest negative protection impulse comes from increased prices on non-
tradable inputs produced in Other private servicing and Construction. These naturally sheltered
industries were adversely affected by protection of tradable inputs, which increased their costs and
Table 4. Percentage change in prices from all trade barriers
1989 1991 1994
Exposed industries Producer
price
Input
price
ERP Producer
price
Input
price
ERP Producer
price
Input
price
ERP
Agriculture 45.6 30.5 37.7 49.9 30.7 49.3 59.7 16.6 68.4
Forestry 0.2 2.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.9 0.2
Fishery 0.0 2.0 -4.0 0.0 1.0 -2.2 -1.0 1.4 -1.4
Processing of food, beverages
and tobacco 44.3 26.1 252.1 48.4 27.9 495.2 39.7 29.7 79.5
Manufacturing of textiles and
clothes 4.5 5.8 1.8 3.5 5.5 0.5 3.6 4.3 2.5
Manufacturing of wood and
wood products 0.2 1.4 -2.2 0.1 1.1 -1.9 0.1 0.3 -0.6
Manufacturing of chemical and
mineral products 7.6 3.3 16.0 5.9 2.8 13.3 1.4 0.8 2.4
Printing and publishing 0.0 -0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4 -0.4
Pulp and paper industry 0.0 0.4 -1.3 0.0 0.3 -0.9 0.0 0.2 -0.7
Industrial chemicals production 3.5 3.2 4.7 3.3 3.1 4.1 0.3 0.7 -0.8
Mineral oil refining 0.8 0.2 3.1 0.7 0.2 3.7 0.2 0.2 1.5
Metal production 0.2 1.0 -2.2 0.3 0.9 -1.5 0.1 0.4 -0.8
Production of machinery and
hardware 2.8 2.0 4.3 2.8 1.8 4.5 0.3 0.4 0.0
Ship building 1.4 2.2 -0.7 1.1 1.9 -1.6 0.0 0.3 -0.6
Oil platform building 2.9 2.2 8.0 2.8 2.2 6.7 0.0 0.3 -0.5
Sheltered industries
Construction 1.6 2.6 - 1.5 2.2 - 0.5 0.8 -
Banking and Insuring 0.4 1.2 - 0.4 1.1 - 0.2 0.7 -
Production of electricity 0.1 0.3 - 0.2 1.1 - 0.2 0.6 -
Domestic transport 0.5 1.2 - 0.5 1.2 - 0.2 0.4 -
Wholesale and retail trade 0.1 0.2 - -0.1 -0.2 - 0.3 0.7 -
Dwelling services 0.3 1.3 - 0.3 1.2 - 0.1 0.5 -
Other private services 1.7 4.6 - 1.6 4.4 - 1.1 2.6 -
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producer prices. Other private servicing, which encompasses repairing, used protected machines and
electrical articles. So did Construction, which, in addition, was negatively affected by NTBs on
cement products. On top, both used input of non-tradable services, whose prices were again affected
by protected inputs. Obviously, all this simultaneity is not easy to grasp without a model for ERP
computation.
A strong political conclusion to draw from table 4, is that the policy of restricting imports of
Processed food, purported to compensate for the high, protected agricultural input prices, seems to
severely overshoot the mark. While accurate compensation should yield ERPs close to zero,
Processing of food, beverages and tobacco attains higher ERP than any other industry.
5.2 . The quantitative significance of NTBs
A decomposition of ERPs into effects form tariffs and NTBs are presented in Table 5. The ERP levels
are completely dominated by NTBs. So is the ranking, which indicates the qualitative redirection of
resources due to protection. If tariffs were to represent the trade barriers, Manufacturing of textiles
and clothes would, quite misleading, be placed along with Processing of food, beverages and tobacco
above the average ERP level, indicating a higher activity in this industry than if protection was absent.
Focusing on tariffs would, further, completely ignore the resource diverting role of protection of
Agriculture, which with respect to tariffs obtain among the lowest ERPs. Tariff movements are
neither able to explain much of the changes in protection over time. The average ERP from NTBs
increased from 1989 to 1991, until the liberalising EEA treaty reduced the effects of NTBs markedly
in 1994. The corresponding changes in average ERPs from tariffs were much weaker, also in
percentage terms.
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Table 5. A decomposition of ERPs for exposed industries
1989 1991 1994
tariffs NTBs all tariffs NTBs all tariffs NTBs all
Agriculture -0.4 38.2 37.7 -0.1 49.4 49.3 -0.2 68.5 68.4
Forestry 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
Fishery -1.3 -2.7 -4.0 -1.7 -0.6 -2.2 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4
Processing of food, beverages
and tobacco 21.8 230.3 252.1 39.9 455.4 495.2 9.5 69.8 79.5
Manufacturing of textiles and
clothes 3.6 -1.7 1.8 4.0 -3.5 0.5 4.8 -2.4 2.5
Manufacturing of wood and
wood products -0.2 -2.0 -2.2 -0.2 -1.7 -1.9 0.0 -0.5 -0.6
Printing and publishing -0.1 1.0 0.9 -0.1 1.1 1.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
Pulp and paper industry -0.2 -1.0 -1.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7
Industrial chemicals
production 0.5 4.2 4.7 0.4 3.6 4.1 0.2 -1.0 -0.8
Mineral oil refining 0.0 3.0 3.1 0.1 3.6 3.7 0.0 1.5 1.5
Metal production -0.1 -2.2 -2.2 -0.1 -1.4 -1.5 0.0 -0.8 -0.8
Production of machinery and
hardware 0.9 3.3 4.3 0.9 3.6 4.5 0.4 -0.4 0.0
Ship building -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -1.2 -1.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6
Oil platform building -0.5 8.5 8.0 -0.6 7.4 6.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5
Average*) 1.1 18.3 17.2 1.2 21.8 20.5 1.0 14.5 13.5
*)
 Average ERPs are weighted with factor income valued by free trade (reference) prices.
Though the increasing importance of NTBs is recognised, their quantitative role relative to tariffs
turns out to be remarkable strong and calls for more attention to proper measuring and estimation. The
Norwegian case is hardly unique in this respect. Accurate nominal estimates become even more
important, as their influence on resource allocation is a result of complicated multiplier effects - even
in a simple model as applied here. The sensitivity of the results to the input estimates would be even
more difficult to predict in a general equilibrium setting.
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5.3 . The qualitative role of NTBs
In a regime where quantity-oriented NTBs exist, imposing tariffs on outputs or inputs will leave ERPs
unaffected. Introducing tariffs as the sole protection measure (or in presence of penetration cost
barriers, only), will increase prices accordingly. In this second regime, ERP will increase in case of
raised output prices and decrease in case of raised input prices. The potential for ERP differences
between these two regimes is determined by the coverage of quantity-oriented protection (see Table
3)28.
Table 6 compares the effects of introducing the factual tariff rates of 1989, 1991, and 1994 into these
two different regimes29. The figures reveal that the regime is of some importance to Processing of
food, beverages and tobacco and Manufacturing of textiles and clothes. For the former, the value
added price is hardly increasing in presence of NTBs, as coverage of prohibitive barriers is high. An
interesting, though smaller, effect from the character of the regime is found for Fishery. Here, NTBs
influence ERPs negatively, indicating that inputs are protected by tariffs and prohibitive barriers. This
is true for fodder products included in Processed food, which are important inputs in fish farming.
The figures in Table 6 are generally low, indicating that when tariffs are as low as the Norwegian,
endogenising tariff equivalents will not turn out as overwhelmingly important. My point is, however,
just as relevant in studies of policy changes with a far stronger potential. First, Norway far from tops
the international ranking when it comes to tariff levels and prevalence of quota arrangements (see
OECD (1996)). For many countries, the qualitative aspect of NTBs will be more relevant to tariff
policy studies. Second, my point also applies to changes in other commercial policy measures than
tariffs. Consider subsidies; though these have traditionally not been regarded as trade policy
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 Also the coverage of inputs, in an input-output-corrected sense, contributes to the difference.
29
 To provide comparable percentage changes, the same level of reference protection is used in the two simulations; only the
functioning of the quantity-oriented measures differs.
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instruments, they certainly affect competitiveness. Recent international agreements on trade issues, as
the Maastricht treaty of EU of 1991 and the WTO treaty of 1995, have banned several forms of
governmental support. As for protection, first order effects of subsidies on factor income may be
measured by ERPs30. Subsidy changes to exposed industries do not change prices, but affect ERPs
through unit cost shifts, both directly and indirectly through price effects on sheltered inputs. Table 7
compares the isolated ERP effects of all net governmental support to Norwegian industries in the two
cases with and without NTBs present.
Table 6. ERPs from tariffs in absence and presence of NTBs, respectively
1989 1991 1994
NTBs
present
NTBs
absent
NTBs
present
NTBs
absent
NTBs
present
NTBs
absent
Agriculture 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Forestry 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fishery -0.1 -1.4 -0.2 -1.7 -0.3 -0.3
Processing of food, beverages and tobacco 0.4 6.6 0.8 7.2 1.1 5.7
Manufacturing of textiles and clothes 1.7 3.6 2.1 4.2 3.3 4.9
Manufacturing of wood and wood
products -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0
Manufacturing of chemi-cal and mineral
products 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0
Printing and publishing -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Pulp and paper industry -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Industrial chemicals production 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
Mineral oil refining 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Metal production -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Production of machinery and hardware 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4
Ship building -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3
Oil platform building -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1
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 This extended ERP concept including effects from commercial policy measures other than protection, is often referred to
as Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA). It was introduced by the Industry Commission of Australia by the mid 60's (see
Plunkett et al. (1992)).
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Table 7. ERPs31 from subsidies in absence and presence of NTBs, respectively32
1989 1991 1994
subsidy
rate*)
pre-
sence
ab-
sence
subsidy
rate
pre-
sence
ab-
sence
subsidy
rate
pre-
sence
ab-
sence
Agriculture 43.3 0.0 205.8 42.8 0.0 235.6 43.4 0.0 128.8
Forestry 5.8 15.2 10.6 5.1 -9.8 9.1 7.3 9.6 8.1
Fishery 10.0 72.7 39.7 11.0 105.3 56.7 4.3 5.2 4.8
Processing of food,
beverages and tobacco
0.4 -0.3 -8.0 0.5 -0.2 -4.4 1.0 -1.3 1.2
Manufacturing of textiles
and clothes
1.0 4.2 0.9 1.4 5.4 2.1 0.7 3.4 0.2
Manufacturing of wood and
wood products
0.6 0.0 -0.4 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2
Manufacturing of chemical
and mineral products
2.0 3.0 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 2.5 2.1
Printing and publishing 1.2 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.7 3.1 2.9
Pulp and paper industry 0.2 -4.4 -4.7 0.2 -6.1 -6.3 0.3 -1.1 -1.4
Industrial chemicals
production
0.1 -4.2 -5.8 0.1 -4.9 -6.3 0.3 -0.8 -1.3
Mineral oil refining 0.0 -10.7 -11.0 0.0 -13.2 -13.3 0.1 -4.2 -4.6
Metal production 0.3 -11.1 -11.3 0.4 -11.7 -11.7 0.2 -1.0 -1.4
Production of machinery
and hardware
0.7 0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2
Ship building 8.4 32.3 31.9 6.7 35.1 34.8 9.5 35.1 34.8
Oil platform building 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.8 3.7 2.9 0.2 0.0 -0.3
*) Direct net subsidies per unit of gross production.
Given the elements of quantity-oriented barriers, high subsidy levels (input-output-corrected) increase
the potential for ERP differences between the two regimes. The ERP figures from the simulations
with no regard to NTBs, show that Agriculture, Fishery, Ship building and Forestry are all
substantially net subsidised. Major contributions come from direct transfers, represented by net
subsidy rates in Table 7. Observe also, that in spite of positive net subsidy rates, several industries are
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 The reference is here defined as value added prices in case of no subsidies, but with factual protection.
32
 Note that the ERP levels across Table 6 and 7 may not be meaningfully compared, as the references for the changes are not
similarly defined.
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effectively net taxed. They use inputs either subject to excise taxes (this applies mainly to certain food
commodities, electricity, fuel and petroleum), or provided by net taxed naturally sheltered production
(most prominent in Domestic transport and Wholesale and retail trade), which shifts effects of taxes
on to prices.
Table 7 reveals that now, proper modelling with endogenised equivalent tariff rates does matter
significantly. There are two effects from quantity-oriented measures, when introducing net subsidies.
In industries with quantity-oriented protection of outputs, prices decrease and dampen value added
changes. The barriers thus cause ERPs to fall in case of net subsidies, and to raise in case of net taxes.
Due to this, ERPs fall substantially in Agriculture, while they raise in Processing of food, beverages
and tobacco. Also the remaining output-protected industries have elements of this, but here another
effect dominates: With NTBs qualitatively in function, inputs with quantity-oriented barriers become
cheaper when subsidised. Thus, consumers of these inputs get higher ERPs. This effect is observed in
practically all industries, but note Fishery, Forestry and Manufacturing of textiles and clothes, in
particular.
6. Conclusion
Quantifying NTBs involves careful considerations with respect to the purpose of the study as well as
to the specific industrial organisation of the markets in focus. In several trade policy analyses, NTBs
are only roughly treated, if included at all. The contribution of this paper is, within an ERP
framework, to demonstrate that applying quantitatively and qualitatively simplifying assumptions on
protection may have serious implications. NTBs are comprehensively identified, quantified and
categorised with respect to their qualitative role. ERP computations show that proper quantification as
well as considerations to input-output effects generate outcomes which are not trivial to forecast in
advance. More severe than to be inaccurate in quantitative terms, is, however, the inclination to
neglect the qualitative role of NTBs. In studies of liberalisation or commercial policy reforms of a
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certain potential, the role of endogenous equivalent tariff rates must be considered carefully. The
considerations made here with respect to estimation and modelling of protection rates apply to trade
policy analyses in general, irrespective of the model complexity. So do the conclusions' emphasis on
the allocative potential of NTBs, though only a complete computable model of the economy would be
able to provide exhaustive and quantified results on their structural implications.
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